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Research suggests that the ability to understand one’s own and others’ minds, or
mentalizing, is a key factor for mental health. Most studies have focused the attention
on the association between global measures of mentalizing and specific disorders. In
contrast, very few studies have analyzed the association between specific mentalizing
polarities and global measures of mental health. This study aimed to evaluate whether
self and other polarities of mentalizing are associated with a multidimensional notion
of mental health, which considers symptoms, functioning, and well-being. Additionally,
the level or depth of mentalizing within each polarity was also analyzed. A sample
of 214 adolescents (12–18 years old, M = 14.7, and SD = 1.7; 53.3% female) was
evaluated on measures of self- (Trait Meta-Mood Scale or TMMS-24) and other-
mentalizing (Adolescent Mentalizing Interview or AMI), multi-informed measures of
psychopathology and functioning based on Achenbach’s system, and measures of
psychological well-being (self-esteem, happiness, and motivation to life goals). Results
revealed no association between mentalizing polarities and higher-order symptom
factors (internalizing, externalizing, and global symptoms or “p” factor). Self-mentalizing
was associated with self-esteem (B = 0.076, p < 0.0005) and motivation to life goals
(B = 0.209, p = 0.002), and other-mentalizing was associated to general, social and
role functioning (B = 0.475, p < 0.0005; B = 0.380, p = 0.005; and B = 0.364,
p = 0.004). This association between aspects of self-other mentalizing and self-other
function has important implications for treatment and prevention. Deeper mentalizing
within each polarity (i.e., comprehension beyond simple attention to one’s own mental
states, and mentalizing referred to attachment figures vs. mentalizing referred to the
characters of a story) revealed stronger associations with functioning and well-being.
Because mentalizing polarities are associated with functioning and well-being but not
with symptoms, a new hypothesis is developed: mentalizing does not contribute to
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resiliency by preventing symptoms, but by helping to deal with them, thus improving
functioning and well-being independently of psychopathology. These findings support
that promoting mentalizing across development may improve mental health, even in
non-clinical population.
Keywords: self-other mentalizing, polarities, symptoms, functioning, well-being, adolescents, non-clinical
population, mental health
INTRODUCTION
One pivotal challenge of neuroscience is to understand
how one mind knows other minds (Amodio and Frith,
2006; Carruthers, 2019). Consciousness about one’s own
mental states (emotions, intentions, desires, and thoughts)
and those of others is a high-order cognition that has been
approached from several perspectives. Social intelligence
(Thorndike and Stein, 1937), social cognition (Heider, 1967),
Theory of Mind (Premack and Woodruff, 1978), mind-
blindness (Baron-Cohen, 1990), Intra- and Inter- personal
intelligence (Gardner, 1987), and Emotional Intelligence
(Salovey and Mayer, 1993) are some of the myriad terms used
across the Twentieth century to refer the human capacity
to be aware of the states of the mind, i.e., the intentional
states (emotions, feelings, and drives) that underpin human
behavior (Allen et al., 2008; Choi-Kain et al., 2008). The
proliferation of theories to approach this higher order
cognition reveals a persistent interest in this capacity, but
also contributes to a proliferation of cousin-concepts referred to
the same brain function.
Mentalization as a Multi-Dimensional
Higher Order Cognition
In this context, the mentalization paradigm neither provides
a new concept nor discovers a novel ability (Bateman and
Fonagy, 2019), but organizes the field from a multidimensional
perspective based on advances in neuroscience (Kim, 2015).
Mentalization refers to the brain’s ability to keep the mind
in mind (Frith and Frith, 2003). In other words, it defines
our capacity to be aware of the intentional mental states such
as emotions, feelings, intentions, and thoughts that underpin
one’s own and others’ behavior (Frith and Frith, 2006). The
mentalization paradigm provides a unified, transtheoretical
and transdiagnostic perspective, and encompassing cousin-
concepts organized around four polarities (Allen et al., 2008).
According to this organization, mentalization can be automatic
or controlled, cognitive or affective, internally or externally
focused, and referred to one’s own (self) or others’ mental states
(Luyten et al., 2020).
Mentalization and Mental Health
The ability to consider mental states makes possible to
understand human’s behavior and to navigate our complex
social world (Freeman, 2016). By contrast, problems with
this ability are associated with difficulties in social and
psychological functioning (e.g., autism spectrum disorders)
and poor of mental health (Katznelson, 2014). Further,
research shows that mentalizing is non-specifically affected
in the presence of psychopathology regardless the type of
disorder (Sharp et al., 2008). Mentalizing problems are
prominent in personality disorders, especially in borderline
and antisocial personality disorder, as well as in depression,
anxiety, social anxiety, trauma-related disorders, attachment
disorders, eating disorders, addictions, somatoform disorders,
autism, and psychosis (see Ballespí et al., 2018; Bateman and
Fonagy, 2019; Luyten et al., 2020, for a review). This non-
specific association suggests that mentalizing is decreased when
mental health decreases. Possibly for this reason, mentalization
is commonly targeted to restore mental health, making it
a common factor in most psychological treatments (Allen
et al., 2008; Fernández-Sotos et al., 2019). Taken together,
this evidence suggests that mentalization is a key factor for
mental health.
The Current Study
To date, most studies have focused attention on the association
between global measures of mentalizing and specific disorders. In
contrast, very few studies have analyzed the association between
specific mentalizing polarities and global measures of mental
health. Moreover, the role of each polarity of mentalization is
typically not evaluated. Measures of self- and other mentalizing
are usually used interchangeably in the literature, and the
level or depth of mentalizing is not often distinguished when
comparing studies. To better understand the role of mentalizing
in salutogenesis, the multidimensional nature of this capacity
needs to be considered (Luyten et al., 2020).
The first aim of this study was to evaluate whether different
polarities of mentalizing, specifically self- vs. other-mentalizing,
are associated with different dimensions of mental health.
Recent debates further developed the classic definition of World
Health Organization, whereby mental health is not only the
absence of mental disorders but also considers social- and
role- functioning along with psychological well-being (World
Health Organization (WHO), 2018). In fact, this wide-reaching
definition of mental health has been refined considering “. . .a
dynamic state of internal equilibrium” as well as the “. . .ability
to cope with adverse life events and function in social roles”
(Galderisi et al., 2015, 2017). Consistently, mental health was
operationalized in the current study using the number of
symptoms, one’s level of social- and role- functioning, and
measures of psychological well-being (i.e., happiness, self-esteem,
and transcendence or motivation to life goals). Basing on this
multi-dimensional view, we hypothesized that self- and other
polarities of mentalizing might be differently associated to self-
and other- function.
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The Hypothetical Association Between
Self- Mentalizing, Inner Functioning and
Internalizing Problems
The capacity to be aware of one’s own mental states is useful
to deal with one’s own suffering. Self-awareness or insight
into one’s own mental states is a common ingredient in all
psychological treatments (Allen et al., 2008). Specifically, self-
mentalizing is important to be aware of- and to understand
what one is feeling (Oldershaw et al., 2010; Lumley et al., 2017),
to determine whether one’s emotional suffering decreases after
an intervention (Davis et al., 2019), or to understand why we
react the way we do toward others (Fonagy and Target, 1997;
Frith, 1999; Brackett et al., 2006). Self-mentalizing also promotes
self-regulation (Fonagy et al., 2005; Heatherton, 2011), thus
suggesting a role in the “digestion” of one’s own feelings.
Because internalizing problems are defined as those in which
suffering is directed inward (e.g., anxiety, depression, and somatic
complaints; Achenbach et al., 2016), we hypothesized that
“self ” polarity of mentalizing would be especially associated
with internalizing problems. Likewise, if self-mentalizing helps
to manage one’s own mental states, and psychological well-
being or internal equilibrium are usually associated with mental
processes, we also predicted that self-mentalizing would be more
strongly associated with measures of psychological well-being
(i.e., happiness, self-esteem, and life-motivation) than would
other-mentalizing.
The Hypothetical Association Between
Other-Mentalizing, Social-Functioning,
and Externalizing Problems
The capacity to understand others’ mental states is an advantage
to navigate in the social world (Amodio and Frith, 2006).
An adequate interpretation of others’ minds is associated with
better social and role functioning (Brackett et al., 2006; Perera
and DiGiacomo, 2013; Miao et al., 2017), higher quality of
social interaction (Lopes et al., 2004), and sociometric status
(Slaughter et al., 2015; Lonigro et al., 2018), less inter-personal
conflicts (García-Sancho et al., 2014), more secure attachment
style (Fonagy and Bateman, 2016), and higher social support (Di
Fabio, 2015). Because our social and role functioning occur in
the social world, it was hypothesized that mentalization regarding
others’ mental states might be more associated with social and
role functioning than self-mentalizing.
Psychopathological problems expressed outside the individual
and with a special impact in the social world are defined
as externalizing problems (Achenbach et al., 2016) and
involve symptoms with an particular impact on others (e.g.,
impulsivity, aggression, oppositionism, and rule-breaking
behavior; Liu, 2004). Studies of Borderline Personality
Disorder (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009; Sharp et al., 2011)
and aggression (Dolan and Fullam, 2004; Taubner et al.,
2013) show that mentalizing about others’ intentions and
feelings is associated with externalizing symptoms. However,
acting out is also associated with emotional dysregulation,
which is in turn associated with problems of self-mentalizing
(Fonagy et al., 2005). Thus, we hypothesized that both self-
and other- polarities of mentalizing would be associated to
externalizing symptoms.
The Hypothetical Association Between
Levels of Self- and Other- Mentalizing
Polarities and Level of Mental Health
The degree or depth of mentalizing processes is not typically
evaluated in research. The awareness of one’s own mental
states can be operationalized either as simple attention to
one’s own emotions (that is, the degree to which individuals
notice their feelings) or as further comprehension or emotional
clarity (that is, the ability to distinguish and to understand
one’s mood; Mayer and Gaschke, 1988; Salovey et al., 1995).
These levels of emotional awareness (e.g., attention vs. further
comprehension) are usually assessed in separate studies or,
more rarely, they are assessed in the same study but refer to
a very specific psychopathological condition (e.g., Butler et al.,
2018; Ballespí et al., 2019). However, no study has considered
these different levels of emotional awareness in the context of
general mental health, especially in a sample of non-clinical
general population.
Similarly, mentalization about others’ mental states can be
evaluated on a spectrum of profundity. Other-mentalization
is measured using myriad methods that are often compared
in research, in spite of the important differences existing
among them (Luyten et al., 2019). Two primary groups of
methods exist: Clinical interviews based on primary attachment
figures, and film- or picture-based measures which are non-
specific to the individual being evaluated. When using an
attachment interview, mentalizing is evaluated with regard to
well-known close-others such as family members and based on
internal cues, which requires the individual to draw on complex
representations of attachment figures (i.e., the working model;
Fonagy and Target, 1997). In contrast, film- or picture-based
measures utilize characters and stories to prompt reasoning for
the motivations behind characters’ actions. In such a measure,
there is not a complex representation of a specific well-
known other, but mentalizing is based on general knowledge
about social behavior and on the external cues of these
characters like facial expression, gestures, and tone of voice
(Frith and Frith, 2012).
It can be argued that mentalizing activity which refers
to an “insignificant” character of a picture-based story is
disparate to mentalizing activity of a real, close other. While
a story character activates general social knowledge, a specific
person, whom an individual holds an affective bond to
(attachment relationship) activates a unique “working model”
of the figure, with very concrete, complete and refined
knowledge about the personality and social functioning of
this specific close other (Collins et al., 2006). These different
levels of mentalizing referred to others’ mental states, based
on a different degree of specificity or depth, should be also
distinguished. This distinction, however, is lacking from the
literature, whereby different studies with inconsistent measures
of mentalizing are compared.
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Consequently, the second aim of this study was to analyze
whether the level of self- or other- mentalizing is associated
with symptoms, functioning and well-being. Regarding the
self- polarity, attention vs. further comprehension of one’s
own emotional states is distinguished in the relationship with
symptoms, functioning and well-being. Regarding the other-
polarity, mentalizing referred to the characters of a picture-
based story (i.e., unspecific others) is distinguished from
mentalizing referred to specific and real attachment figures,
which is expected to be more refined (Fonagy and Target, 1997;
Fonagy and Bateman, 2016).
We hypothesized that deeper levels of mentalizing (that
is, a higher relative ability to mentalize) would be more
strongly associated to mental health. Specifically, it was expected
that comprehension of one’s own emotional states would
be more strongly associated to internalizing symptoms and
psychological well-being than simple attention (i.e., a less
profound understanding of one’s own internal mental states).
Further, mentalizing about attachment figures is more specific
and refined, and it better reflects the degree of sophistication
that someone is able to reach when mentalizing. Therefore, we
predicted that attachment-based mentalizing, that is, mentalizing
referred to significant close others (attachment figures) might
be more strongly associated with externalizing symptoms and
social- and role- functioning than mentalizing referred to the
characters of a story (i.e., general or ‘insignificant others).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
This study was based on a sample of adolescents from the general
population. Importantly, mentalization is quite developed at
adolescence. Furthermore, both psychopathological and a wide
range of subclinical problems are quite prevalent in community
adolescent samples (Merikangas et al., 2010; Muris et al., 2011).
Participants were recruited from schools within the context of
a broader project about psychopathology, personality, and coping
skills. The inclusion criteria were: (1) to be in the eligible age
range of the study (12–18); (2) to speak Spanish or Catalan (i.e.,
the languages of the questionnaires). The exclusion criteria were:
(1) presence of severe mental illness such as autism spectrum
disorder, psychosis or intellectual disability; (2) parents, teachers
or adolescents failing to fill in one or more scales. Five out
of 10 invited schools agreed to participate, thus providing an
eligible sample of 1735 families. Primary participation refusal
reasons included low interest in the project, being too busy, or
refusal to provide data about family’s mental health. The final
sample consisted of 214 adolescents (53.3% of girls) aged 12
to 18 years old (M = 14.7, SD = 1.7). Approximately 87% of
the participants were Caucasian (White-European), 9% Arabic,
2% Asian, and 2% Latino. Most adolescents came from families
with middle socio-economic level (72%), although there was
a bias to medium-high and high socio-economic level (10.3%
Low, 13.6% Medium-Low, 18.7% Medium, 39.7% Medium-





This is a brief, two-part, semi-structured interview (Ballespí
and Pérez-Domingo, 2015) specifically designed for adolescents
and originally created in Spanish and Catalan to obtain an
interview-based score of mentalization in a short time (i.e.,
20–30 min depending on the responses of the participant). It
consists of two guided exercises with 7 questions scored from 0
to 4, for which 0 indicates that mentalization is “Absent” in the
individual’s response, 1 that it is “Poor,” 2 “Sufficient,” 3 “Good,”
and 4 “Sophisticated.” The first part (3 items) is a story-based
procedure used to ask the adolescent about the mental states
of the characters of a fictitious illustrated story. In the second
part, individuals are encouraged to choose two very-close-others
(i.e., two people important for them at this moment of their
life; Bartholomew and Horowitz, 1991) and different demand
questions (Fonagy et al., 1998) are made in order to explicitly
elicit mentalizing ability (e.g., “Why do you think he reacted
like that?”). The first part is aimed to provide a measure of
non-attachment-based mentalizing since it is referred to fictious
unknown characters of a story (i.e., “insignificant” others).
The second part is aimed to measure mentalization toward an
attachment figure, i.e., a significant close other. Reliability in the
present sample is good both for the total scale (α = 0.91) and the
subscales (α = 0.88 and α = 0.85), respectively.
Trait Meta-Mood Scale
The Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS-24) measures the 3
dimensions of meta-cognition defined through factor analysis
according to the model of Mayer and Salovey (Mayer and
Gaschke, 1988): attention, comprehension (emotional clarity),
and repair (emotional regulation) toward one’s own emotional
states. The widely used 24-items version was selected (Fernandez-
Berrocal et al., 2004). All 24 items are scored from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The first two dimensions of
attention and emotional clarity or comprehension were used in
the present study. The attention scale includes items such as “I
pay a lot of attention to how I feel,” while the clarity scale evaluates
the understanding of one’s emotional states and includes items
like “I almost always know exactly how I am feeling,” or “I can’t
make sense out of my feelings.” The internal consistency in the
current sample is excellent (α = 0.91 for the total score, α = 0.90
for attention, and α = 0.92 for comprehension).
Psychopathology
Achenbach’s System for Empirically Based Assessment
Achenbach’s System for Empirically Based Assessment (ASEBA)
is a well-known dimensional and empirically derived system
to classify psychopathology with good psychometric properties
(Achenbach, 2020a). Second order scales of general, internalizing
and externalizing problems reported from parents’ and teachers’
were used in the current study (Achenbach, 2020b). The Spanish
adaptation (Achenbach and Rescorla, 2001) shows excellent
internal consistency both for the Child Behavior Check-List or
CBCL (α ranges from 0.78 to 0.97) and the Teacher’s Report Form
or TRF (α ranges from 0.72 to 0.97), as well as adequate test-retest
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reliability in both cases (ICC from 0.85 to 0.90 for CBCL, and
0.60–0.90 for the TRF).
Drawing from the complementary perspective provided
by parents and teachers (De Los Reyes and Kazdin, 2005),
multi-informant indices of symptoms and functioning were
developed. Using principal component analysis, the standardized
object scores in the one-factor solution were used to combine
parents’ and teachers’ scores in one single measure. Thus,
multi-informed indexes of Total (70% of explained variance;
weights = 0.84; α = 0.58), Internalizing (68% of explained
variance; weights = 0.82; α = 0.53), and Externalizing problems
(67% of explained variance; weights = 0.82; α = 0.50) were
obtained. The psychometric properties of these indices are
adequate since they combine information from complementary
(i.e., usually discrepant) informants (De Los Reyes et al., 2015).
Psychological Functioning
The CBCL/6-18 (parents’ form) provides 3 indices of functioning
(Activities, Social, and School) along with one summarizing
all of them (the total competence scale). The TRF/6-18
(teacher’s form) provides a scale of academic performance,
four dimensions of adaptive functioning (Working Hard,
Behaving, Learning, and Happy) and a total score based on
those four (total adaptive functioning; see the profiles in
Achenbach, 2020b). Using the same procedure as in the case of
psychopathology described above, three multi-informed general
indices of functioning were developed combining parents’ and
teachers’ reports: Social Functioning (i.e., peer relationships,
sociometric status, and involvement with family members; 55%
of explained variance, weights from 0.62 to 0.81, α = 0.49),
Role Functioning (i.e., performance in academic and extra-
academic activities like sports or chores; 56% of explained
variance, weights from 0.24 to 0.91, α = 0.73), and General
Functioning (64% of explained variance, weights = 0.80,
α = 0.45).
Well-Being
Modern conceptions of mental health agree on that it consists
not only the absence of symptoms or disorders but a
general state of social and emotional well-being (Bertolote,
2008; World Health Organization (WHO), 2018) or, in
the more refined terms of Galderisi et al. (2017), “. . .a
dynamic state of internal equilibrium which enables individuals
to use their abilities in harmony with universal values of
society.” According to these modern notions, three construct
measures that are usually low in the absence of good mental
health were evaluated: happiness (e.g., Ho et al., 2018),
self-esteem (Pyszczynski et al., 2004; Keane and Loades,
2017), and transcendence (Nygren et al., 2005). As emotional
well-being and self-esteem, motivation is decreased in most
psychopathological conditions (e.g., Vogel et al., 2019), while
positive motivational states (e.g., to have aspirations or goals
in life) denote healthy personality functioning (Seligman and
Peterson, 2006; Zhang and Yu, 2014). Therefore, we included
a motivational measure based on the Aspiration index of
Kasser and Ryan (2001), called here “transcendence,” and
described below.
Happiness was measured through Teachers’ Report Form
(Achenbach, 2020a) which includes a scale of happiness based on
teachers’ ratings to the question “How happy is he/she?” using a
7-point scale (from 1-Much less to 7-Much more).
Self-Esteem was assessed with the widely used Rosenberg’s
Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965), consisting of 10
items rated with 5-point scales according to the degree of
agreement with each statement. The Spanish adaptation shows
adequate psychometric properties (Martín-Albo et al., 2007).
The internal consistency in the current sample was excellent
(α = 0.90).
Transcendence is a scale based on the dimensions of
Spirituality, Community, and Conformity of the Aspiration
Index of Kasser and Ryan (2001; see also Grouzet et al., 2005)
consisting of 12 items rated from 1 to 9 based on the importance
and likelihood of different goals in the life of the participant.
The Spanish adaptation show adequate psychometric properties
(Romero et al., 2012). The internal consistency in the present
sample is good (α = 0.79).
Procedure
The study met ethical standards according to Declaration of
Helsinki and the revision of the Ethics Committee of the
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (CEEAH; Spain) (Ethical
clearance number: CEEAH 2603). Accordingly, we reported how
we determined and obtained our sample, all data exclusions,
all manipulations, and all measures in the study. Families were
informed about the objectives, relevance, and implications of
the research by means of a letter circulated by the school.
Parents, teachers and children were also invited to a meeting
to resolve any questions or concerns regarding the study. All
participants (i.e., parents, adolescents, and teachers) provided
written informed consent and were offered the option of
being informed in the case of one or multiple scales reflecting
dysfunction of clinical significance. Data were recruited in
the schools to simplify logistics. The participants (adolescents,
parents, and teachers) received the questionnaires in closed
envelops with their identities encrypted using alphanumeric
codes and were given a deadline to return them. The instructions
highlighted the importance and reasons that each informant
should complete his or her form in in private, and of
completing the task over the course of multiple sessions to
buffer the effect of fatigue. All forms were reviewed and
returned to the informants in case it was necessary to correct
missing or out-or-range values. The interviews were carried
out individually in private spaces provided by each school
(e.g., an office, and empty classroom). Data collection occurred
over the course of approximately 5 weeks in all schools
included in the study. Paper responses were archived in the
lab with the same alphanumeric codes they were entered to
the data matrix.
Statistical Analysis
We conducted power analyses using Stata V. 16.1. With α = 0.05,
power (1–β) = 0.8, four explanatory variables, and three control
variables, the sample needed to detect a minimum change of 0.05
in R2 was 208. All of the analyses were performed with sample
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size of 214. Linear regressions were conducted using IBM SPSS
Statistics v24.0 package. The results of the association between
mentalizing and each measure of symptoms, functioning and
well-being are presented as linear regression coefficients (B) for
quantitative responses, reporting 95% confidence intervals (95%
CI), and P-values (p).
Because sex, age, and socio-economic level are associated
with both mentalization and psychopathological conditions,
these variables were controlled for in all analyses. Sex is closely
related both to psychopathology (Zahn-Waxler et al., 2008) and
mentalizing (Schulte-Rüther et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2009).
Mentalization is a high-order cognition that becomes more
complex with age (Frith and Frith, 2003; Klindt et al., 2017;
Poznyak et al., 2019), and socioeconomic status (SES) is a well-
known general risk factor for psychopathology (Wadsworth and
Achenbach, 2005) and it is also associated with mentalization
(Mankus et al., 2016).
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Assumptions
of the Models
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the different measures
of mentalization, symptoms, functioning and well-being,
along with the correlations between them. All the significant
correlations show the expected direction. All the regression
models tested met the assumptions of independent errors
(Durwin–Watson test), homoscedasticity (Plot of standardized
predicted values against standardized residuals), normality of
residuals (P–P plot), absence of multicollinearity (VIF and
tolerance), and of influential cases (Cook’s distance).
Aim 1. Self and Other Mentalizing
Polarities and Dimensions of Mental
Health
Table 2 shows that mentalization referred to others’ mental states
was associated with all measures of functioning (B = 0.475,
p < 0.0005 for general functioning; B = 0.380, p = 0.005 for social
functioning; and B = 0.364, p = 0.004 for role functioning), and
self-mentalizing was associated with measures of psychological
well-being (B = 0.076, p < 0.0005 for self-esteem; B = 0.209,
p = 0.002 for transcendence). No mentalizing dimension was
associated with symptoms. Happiness was not associated with
self-mentalizing (B = 0.002, p = 0.728), but it was associated with
the capacity to mentalize others (B = 0.053, p = 0.002).
Aim 2. Levels of Self and Other
Mentalizing and Dimensions of Mental
Health
Table 3 shows levels of self-mentalizing (attention vs.
comprehension) and other-mentalizing (non-attachment
based mentalization of “insignificant” or general others,
vs. mentalizing of well-known attachment figures). Again,
symptoms were not associated with any mentalizing process,
though the subdimensions of attachment-based (others) and
comprehension (self) demonstrated associations in the expected
direction. Thus, deeper levels of mentalizing within each
polarity showed associations with the predicted aspect of mental
health. There were only two exceptions: (1) Attachment-based
mentalizing was associated with general (B = 0.727, p = 0.014)
and role functioning (B = 0.638, p = 0.027), but not with social
functioning, and (2) comprehension of one’s own mental states
revealed an association with self-esteem (B = 0.267, p < 0.0005)
and transcendence (B = 0.335, p = 0.043), but not with happiness.
In fact, happiness was not associated with any dimension of
mentalization, whereas self-esteem was associated with all
but one (i.e., in case of attachment-based others the result is
suggestive but not significant: B = 0.299, p = 0.050).
DISCUSSION
Self and Other Mentalization Polarities
and Dimensions of Mental Health
Research suggests that the capacity of the mind to understand
one’s own and others’ minds is a key factor for mental health
(Luyten et al., 2020). Most studies have focused on the
association between global measures of mentalizing and specific
disorders. In contrast, very few studies have analyzed the
association between specific mentalizing polarities and global
measures of mental health. The first aim of this study was
to analyze whether self and other polarities of mentalizing
were associated with three widely accepted elements of
global mental health, that is: symptoms, functioning and
measures of psychological well-being (self-esteem, happiness,
and motivation to life-goals) as an operationalization of
what recent discussions define as “internal equilibrium”
or internal functioning (Galderisi et al., 2015, 2017;
World Health Organization (WHO), 2018).
In line with our predictions, the capacity to understand others’
mental states was associated with all measures of functioning,
while the capacity to be aware of one’s own mental states was
associated with self-esteem and transcendence (i.e., capacity to
stablish life goals), but not with happiness.
The hypothesized association between happiness and self-
mentalizing was possibly not supported because the current
measure of well-being was based only on the teachers’
reports, that is, on the observation of adolescent behavior
in the academic environment. In the case of well-being,
self-reports are especially important. Future studies with
more comprehensive measures might shed new light on this
point. Interestingly, happiness is associated with mentalizing
referred to others’ mental states. This result has two possible
explanations: (1) the aforementioned reason, whereby the
measure of happiness is based on teachers’ observation in the
academic context where happiness is primarily experienced
through social interaction; and (2) the importance of the
social network for emotional well-being (Chu et al., 2010).
Most studies support that social relationships and the support
they provide are key factors for happiness (Cohen and Wills,
1985; Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Garcia-Carrion et al.,
2019). Thus, if good mentalizing of others provides better
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TABLE 1 | Correlations and descriptive statistics.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Self −
2. Others 0.09 −
3. S. Total −0.12 −0.06 −
4. S. Int −0.12 −0.09 0.74** −
5. S. Ext −0.10 0.01 0.88** 0.45** −
6. F. Gen 0.15* 0.26** −0.50** −0.23** −0.41** −
7. F. Social 0.13 0.20** −0.42** −0.46** −0.23** 0.50** −
8. F. Role 0.14* 0.24** −0.48** −0.13 −0.42** 0.91** 0.30** −
9. WB SE 0.30** 0.01 −0.30** −0.34** −0.22** 0.32** 0.25** 0.22** −
10. WB Hap 0.10 0.19** −0.39** −0.36** −0.26** 0.62** 0.38** 0.59** 0.27** −
11. WB Tran 0.31** 0.16 −0.10 −0.07 −0.14 −0.02 0.08 −0.04 0.20* 0.03 −
Mean 73,89 14,57 1,35 1,29 0,94 25,71 32,16 28,49 21,50 4,51 34,82
SD 15,34 4,95 1,00 1,00 1,00 9,84 10,00 9,82 5,42 1,22 12,71
*p < 0.05 and **p < 0.01. S. Total; Symptoms Total; S. Int: Symptoms Internalizing; S. Ext: Symptoms Externalizing; F. Gen: Functioning General; F. Social: Functioning
Social; F. Role: Functioning Role; WB SE: Well-being Self-esteem; WB Hap: Well-being Happiness; and WB Tran: Well-being Transcendence.
TABLE 2 | Association between mentalizing dimensions and different aspects of mental health (n = 214).
Self Others
B (p) 95% CI B (p) 95% CI
Symptoms
Total -0.008 (0.056) −0.017 to 0.0002 −0.003 (0.860) −0.031 to 0.026
Internalizing −0.006 (0.167) −0.014 to 0.002 −0.025 (0.067) −0.052 to 0.002
Externalizing −0.008 (0.085) −0.017 to 0.001 0.013 (0.394) −0.016 to 0.041
Functioning
General 0.051 (0.189) −0.025 to 0.128 0.475 (<0.0005) 0.228 to 0.721
Social 0.040 (0.339) −0.042 to 0.123 0.380 (0.005) 0.113 to 0.646
Role 0.058 (0.132) −0.018 to 0.135 0.364 (0.004) 0.119 to 0.609
Well-being
Self-esteem 0.076 (<0.0005) 0.034 to 0.117 0.117 (0.093) −0.020 to 0.253
Happiness 0.002 (0.728) −0.008 to 0.012 0.053 (0.002) 0.020 to 0.087
Transcendence 0.209 (0.002) 0.079 to 0.340 0.141 (0.534) −0.307 to 0.589
Results are adjusted for age, sex and socio-economic level in all cases. In case of functioning and well-being, results are additionally adjusted for total
psychopathological symptoms. Significant B values are highlighted in bold.
social relationships, then it becomes an “indirect” factor for
emotional well-being.
Further, the role of happiness in mental health has
been recently questioned (Galderisi et al., 2015), which is
an important consideration in light of our negative result.
While the notion of mental health has evolved across one
century to reach beyond symptoms (Bertolote, 2008), the
initial WHO definition of mental health including well-being
(World Health Organization (WHO), 2001) is purported to
be excessively organized around an hedonic and eudaimonic
perspective (Galderisi et al., 2017). Thus, it is possible that
no association between self-mentalizing and happiness was
revealed because happiness, as a hedonic state, is not a
consistent dimension of the “dynamic internal equilibrium”
referred by Galderisi and colleagues as the foundation of
mental health. Future studies with more complete measures
of emotional well-being should clarify this result, along with
studies addressing the broader notion of “dynamic internal
equilibrium,” represented here by the other two measures of
psychological well-being, self-esteem and transcendence, along
with happiness.
The Lack of Association Between
Mentalization Polarities and Internalizing
or Externalizing Symptoms
Regarding symptoms, it was predicted that self-mentalizing
should be associated with internalizing symptoms, while
externalizing problems might be associated with self- and also
other-mentalizing. Results did not support any association
between polarities and symptoms. This is an unexpected finding
for three reasons. Firstly, literature suggests that mentalizing is
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TABLE 3 | Association between levels of self- and others- mentalizing and different aspects of mental health (n = 214).
Self attention Self comprehension Others non-attachment based Others attachment based
B (p) 95% CI B (p) 95% CI B (p) 95% CI B (p) 95% CI
Symptoms
Total 0.005 (0.609) −0.016 to 0.027 −0.017 (0.096) −0.037 to 0.003 0.047 (0.347) −0.051 to 0.144 −0.039 (0.239) −0.105 to 0.026
Internalizing 0.005 (0.624) −0.015 to 0.025 −0.015 (0.109) −0.034 to 0.003 −0.051 (0.278) −0.143 to 0.041 −0.012 (0.693) −0.074 to 0.049
Externalizing 0.003 (0.775) −0.018 to 0.025 −0.011 (0.286) −0.031 to 0.009 0.095 (0.061) −0.005 to 0.195 −0.045 (0.187) −0.112 to 0.022
Functioning
General 0.039 (0.677) −0.145 to 0.223 0.094 (0.299) −0.084 to 0.273 0.100 (0.816) −0.749 to 0.949 0.727 (0.014) 0.152 to 1.302
Social 0.167 (0.107) −0.036 to 0.369 0.020 (0.838) −0.172 to 0.212 0.515 (0.282) −0.426 to 1.456 0.264 (0.409) −0.365 to 0.892
Role 0.022 (0.808) −0.159 to 0.204 0.113 (0.208) −0.063 to 0.289 −0.032 (0.940) −0.871 to 0.806 0.638 (0.027) 0.074 to 1.203
Well-being
Self-esteem −0.172 (0.001) −0.268 to −0.075 0.267 (<0.005) 0.176 to 0.358 −0.054 (0.812) −0.498 to 0.391 0.299 (0.050) 0.000 to 0.598
Happiness 0.010 (0.409) −0.014 to 0.035 −0.004 (0.760) −0.027 to 0.020 0.057 (0.327) −0.057 to 0.171 0.050 (0.198) −0.026 to 0.126
Transcendence 0.173 (0.346) −0.189 to 0.535 0.335 (0.043) 0.011 to 0.658 0.036 (0.965) −1.590 to 1.663 0.234 (0.669) −0.847 to 1.316
Results are adjusted for age, sex and socio-economic level in all cases. Results are additionally adjusted for total psychopathological symptoms in case of
functioning and well-being. Significant B values are highlighted in bold.
a resilience factor because it lacks when mental health lacks
(for a review, see Sharp et al., 2008; Katznelson, 2014), and
it is a common ingredient in all psychological treatments,
that is: to restore mental health, mentalization must be
improved (Allen et al., 2008). This suggests an association
between mentalizing and mental health which should be
applicable to all the three evaluated elements: functioning,
well-being, and also symptoms. Secondly, previous studies
utilizing global measures of mentalizing found no association
with general psychopathology (e.g., Ballespí et al., 2018), but
it was expected that investigation with a multidimensional
measure of mentalizing would provide different results. Finally,
albeit limited, there is evidence supporting the association
between the role of mentalizing in the development of
internalizing and externalizing problems (Sharp et al., 2008).
Nonetheless, this evidence approaches the association from
either a specific psychopathological condition (e.g., autism,
sexual abuse, complex trauma, and borderline symptoms; e.g.,
Ensink et al., 2016) or a trans-generational point of view (i.e.,
maternal reflecting function moderating children externalizing
difficulties; e.g., Ensink et al., 2017; Dejko–Wańczyk et al., 2020),
or comprise a longitudinal design to analyze the trajectories
of externalizing problems based on mentalizing variations
(Morosan et al., 2020).
Our study design was cross-sectional and focused on a simple
intra-individual association: to what extent one’s own mentalizing
capacities are associated to one’s own symptoms. Current
findings do not support the relationship between mentalizing
polarities and symptoms in spite of using measures of higher
order factors of psychopathology (internalizing, externalizing,
and total; Caspi et al., 2014). Several possibilities exist for
this lack of association. Firstly, the multi-informed measure
of symptoms is based on parent- and teacher-reports, but it
lacks adolescents’ self-evaluation. This is a limitation of this
study. However, parent and teacher assessments of functioning
are indeed associated with mentalizing. As such, the lack of
association between symptoms and mentalization stands as an
unresolved question. Secondly, it is possible that more specificity
is required not only in the multidimensional assessment of
mentalizing, but also regarding psychopathology. Perhaps the
imbalance in mentalizing polarities is specific for different
psychopathological conditions (Luyten et al., 2020) but it fades
away when symptoms are grouped in higher-order factors
(internalizing, externalizing, and “p” factor). This new possibility
deserves attention.
The aim of this study was not to analyze specific disorders
but general symptoms in a non-clinical sample. However, the
lack of association between mentalizing polarities and higher-
order factors of symptoms lead us to explore the clinical
dimensions of the ASEBA system. More specificity in this regard
did not change results. That is, when using the specific clinical
scales (e.g., anxious-depressed, anxious-withdrawn) instead of
the general factors (internalizing, externalizing, and general
problems) no association between mentalizing polarities and
the eight clinical scales of ASEBA was revealed, and very
few associations appeared with the six DSM-oriented scales.
Specifically, anxiety problems showed association with self-
attention and oppositional-defiant disorders showed association
with others’ mentalizing. More specificity did not change
results. Of course, there is some contradiction in checking for
clinical dimensions in a non-clinical sample, even when using
a dimensional approach (Achenbach, 2020a,b). However, it is
possible that the association between mentalizing and symptoms
is not dimensional or progressive but qualitatively different in
depending on the level of psychopathology. This might explain
why results are different in clinical samples, where mentalizing
is always impaired. Thus, it is possible that the association
with functioning but not with psychopathology in the current
study is due to the nature of the sample, where variability
regarding functioning and well-being (usually high in non-
clinical populations) is possibly different than variability of
symptoms (usually low), even when using higher-order factors
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(internalizing, externalizing, and global). Studies ranging all the
span of severity (from non-clinical to clinical levels) might reveal
different results.
Association Between Levels of Self- and
Other- Mentalizing and Level of Mental
Health
In contrast to symptoms, the levels of self- and other-
mentalization fit predictions regarding functioning and well-
being with two exceptions. Regarding functioning, while
attachment-based mentalizing was found to be associated with
general and role functioning, it was not associated with social
functioning. This is particularly intriguing because the general
measure of other-mentalizing (Table 2) was indeed associated
with social functioning. Given that social functioning involves
interaction with various individuals, including attachment figures
and insignificant others, there is an association with “global”
other-mentalizing but not with “partial” specific measures.
This leads us to question what types of measures of other-
mentalizing should be used to best evaluate this ability. There are
insignificant variations in standardized image-based measures
such as the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition
(MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006) or the Reading the Mind in
the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) usually
measuring mentalization based on external cues, compared to
measures based on attachment-interviews (e.g., the Reflective
Function Scale; Luyten et al., 2019), which are based on internal
cues. It is possible that these variations have consequential
implications in the multidimensional analysis of mentalizing
and mental health. Knowing that assessment methods differ
in the depth of mentalizing they elicit, and that therefore
results may vary according to the assessment procedure, the
election of the procedure should be made with caution and the
comparison among studies should take variation in measure
types into account.
With regard to well-being, comprehension of one’s own
mental states was positively associated with self-esteem and to
transcendent life goals, but not with happiness. In fact, as in the
case of social functioning, the association of happiness with the
global measure of other-mentalizing (Table 2) disappears when
analyzing the sub-scores of the factor (i.e., attachment-based
or referred to well-known others vs. non-attachment based or
referred to general others; Table 3). Again, this suggests that an
association only exists when combining both aspects of other-
mentalizing (i.e., the general social knowledge used to solve
the picture-based assessment, along with the capacity to read
the specific mental states of particular close-others). Since the
measure of well-being comes from teacher reports in the ASEBA
system, these results should be interpreted with caution. Finally,
since the role of hedonic well-being as a dimension of mental
health has been questioned (Galderisi et al., 2017), our different
results with happiness than with the other measures of internal
well-being (i.e., self-esteem and transcendence) could be coherent
with this perspective.
Interestingly, self-esteem was found to be positively associated
with comprehension and negatively associated with attention to
one’s own emotions. This is consistent with previous findings
and supports the idea that comprehension is more vital to self-
function than simple attention. Too much attention to emotions,
particularly if it lacks understanding of said emotions, can
be overwhelming and it is usually associated with emotional
dysregulation, which blocks mentalizing (Fonagy et al., 2005).
In contrast, comprehension of emotional states is a coping skill
to deal with emotional pain (Allen et al., 2008) and also leads
to self-knowledge (Fonagy and Target, 1997), which is path to
self-acceptance (Wilson, 2009). Therefore, it is reasonable that
self-esteem is associated with good understanding of one’s self.
Limitations and Recommendations for
Further Research
This is a first study showing a specific association between self
and other polarities of mentalizing and aspects of self-other
healthy functioning. Above all, the findings reported in the
present study should be replicated before drawing significant
interpretations. Further, limitations to the research do exist.
First, the cross-sectional design impedes the possibility of
establishing causal relationships. As such, it is unknown whether
the imbalances in self and other polarities of mentalizing are
the cause or the consequence of the mental health dimensions
that were analyzed. Moreover, although a multi-informant-based
method was used for most variables, adolescent self-report
was lacking for most measures. Future studies including self-
reports may further highlight whether no association between
mentalization polarities and symptoms in general population
is indeed present. Finally, better measures of mentalization
polarities are required. The zeitgeist of the study of this
higher order cognition has just begun, and the problem
of how measuring such a complex function still lacks a
solution, especially regarding the self- polarity. In this sense,
the TMMS-24 is a widely used and psychometrically well-
stablished measure of emotional self-awareness, but it is
a self-report, and there is currently no method by which
researchers or clinicians may assess subprocesses or levels of
self-mentalizing, with the only exception of the LEAS (i.e.,
the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale; Lane et al., 1990),
which was dismissed for this study because it is longer (20
social situations about which the adolescent should write with
no limit of words) and not adapted to Spanish and Catalan
population. In this sense, the importance of refining the
multidimensional assessment of mentalizing has been already
highlighted (Luyten et al., 2020).
While some limitations of this research are present and
it would benefit from replication, this study also benefits
from prominent strengths. To our knowledge, this research
is novel in nature–no studies to date have analyzed the
association between self- and other- mentalization polarities
and a multidimensional measure of mental health in a non-
clinical population. This multidimensional approach inherently
considers recent developments in the approach to mental health,
which is trans-diagnostic and trans-symptomatic [Galderisi
et al., 2017; World Health Organization (WHO) (2018)]
involving social and role functioning and measures of “internal
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equilibrium” along with different types of symptoms. Further,
both symptoms and functioning indicators come from multi-
informed measures based on Achenbach’s System for Empirical-
Based Assessment (Achenbach, 2020a), which provides a
dimensional perspective consistent with modern approaches to
mental health (Cuthbert, 2014).
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
MENTAL HEALTH
To our knowledge, this is the first study to show a specific
association between self- and other- mentalizing polarities and
different aspects of mental health. Despite the fact that no
mentalizing dimension was associated with symptoms, this is
the first study to date to show an association between self-other
mentalizing polarities and aspects of self-other function. This
is not only suggestive of adjusting interventions to the specific
aspects of mentalization dimensions that require treatment, but
it also highlights the importance of mentalizing for salutogenesis,
even in a non-clinical sample. In this sense, this novel research
supporting the association between mentalization and mental
health, even in a sample from non-clinical population, stresses
the importance of fostering mentalization not only in the clinical
contexts, when mental health suffers because a disorder was
developed, but also and very especially when the disorder still
lacks and in order to prevent its development.
Mentalization-based treatments help to restore mental health
when it is lacking, and this means to work on mentalization
abilities under the impairing effect of a disorder (and thus,
in suboptimal conditions). Why do not foster such important
abilities when a disorder is not present? According to Heckman’s
equation (Heckman, 2020b), any investment in human potential
prior to the onset of a clinical condition might provide a
higher return the earlier is done, always higher than investing
the same efforts under impairing conditions. This is suggestive
of nurturing mentalization not only in clinical but also in
general population, where mentalization is also associated to
positive mental health, according to current results. However,
this begs the question of why our societies and educational
systems invest such financial resources and attention to
traditional literacy (reading, writing, and reasoning) while invest
a relative absence of resources in the “emotional literacy” of the
general population. The school formal curriculum is aimed at
training children in competences of unquestionable relevance
(i.e., languages, mathematics, social and natural knowledge,
sciences, physical education, arts, and digital learning) across
a minimum of 10 years. Out of school activities are aimed
at providing specialized attention to improving sports, playing
a musical instrument, speaking a new language or training
other skills. Interestingly, we only seek specialized attention
for our socio-emotional competences once there is a clinically
diagnosable issue. The present results support a call to
invert this situation.
Current findings support an association between
mentalization polarities and mental health in a sample
of adolescents from general population. This association
highlights the importance of promoting mentalization in
developmental non-clinical population, when mental health is
not disrupted and learning conditions are optimal. Fostering
mentalization across the developmental stage, in adolescence or
possibly earlier, may not only meet the standards set forth by
Heckman (Heckman, 2020a) and the idea to nurture a “dynamic
internal equilibrium” which is the foundation of mental health
(Galderisi et al., 2015). Moreover, fostering mentalization
across development: (1) might help to develop mentalizing
in a more natural manner than the intensive treatments do
once clinical threshold is met, (2) might provide resilience
throughout development as mentalizing is promoted from
early stages, and (3) might help to produce an adult with better
mentalizing abilities and therefore a generation more able to
mentalize the subsequent one. Finally and most importantly,
fostering mentalization across development may incorporate
one of the UNESCO’s challenges (UNESCO, 2017, 2019) for
the Education of the millennium citizen: this will educate
individuals to properly regulate their emotions and to help
others to do so.
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